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Work and Economic Outcomes After Welfare
THOMAS P. VARTANIAN
JUSTINE M. MCNAMARA
Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research
Bryn Mawr College
Using data from the 1969 to 1993 Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
this article examines a number of models to determine the characteristics
of AFDC recipients who fare well economically after they initially leave
the welfare system. The study includes analyses of income levels, time
spent employed and not employed, and time spent below the poverty line.
Hypotheses regarding state welfare payments, area economic conditions,
human capital and time spent receiving welfare are examined. The findings
indicate that area employment conditions and the ability to quickly find
work greatly affect the likelihood of faring well economically after welfare.
We found that time spent receiving welfare had some small negative effects
on post-welfare economic outcomes. However, former welfare recipients
living in states with more generous welfare payments are as likely to
work, to not use welfare, and are generally as well off as those living in
states with less generous welfare payments. These results indicate that high
welfare benefit levels may not be a disincentive to work. The findings also
indicate that women who have little job experience, who lack education,
and who have many or more children after AFDC, fare economically worse
than others.
With the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), welfare recipi-
ents will be expected to work far more than in the previous 60 year
history of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program. States will soon have the choice of either enforcing work
requirements for welfare recipients, including specifications that
50 percent of all welfare recipients are involved in work related
activities by 2002, or lose at least part of their Federal block grant
funds for welfare. These provisions, as well as the newly imposed
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five year limit on welfare receipt, will ensure that a far larger
number of welfare or former welfare recipients will participate in
the labor force.
While most recipients will be limited in the number of years
that they may receive welfare, Federal and state governments are
not guaranteeing jobs for the newly ineligible. This may mean that
even during periods of economic prosperity that some former re-
cipients will not be able to secure work; they will have to somehow
find the means to support their families without the benefits of
public assistance and without assured public employment. Many
may be forced to live below the meagre income levels that they
had while receiving welfare (Holzer and Danziger, 1998).
Contrary to this position, critics of welfare claim that de-
creased public benefits will both render welfare less attractive and
increase the work efforts of former AFDC recipients (Hernnstein
and Murray, 1994; Mead, 1986). This may mean higher standards
of living for former recipients as their hours of work and earnings
increase. As fewer families receive welfare, fewer children will
grow up in a welfare "culture" (Lewis, 1968), which will result in
a lower need for welfare in the future.
While considerable research has examined the predictors of
exiting AFDC either on a yearly basis (Bane and Ellwood 1994;
Ellwood 1986; O'Neill, Bassi, and Wolf 1987; Vartanian 1997) or on
a monthly basis (Blank 1989; Fitzgerald 1991; Gleason, Rangara-
jan, and Schochet, 1998), little research has been conducted on
how AFDC recipients fare in the job market after they no longer
receive AFDC income ( Danziger and Lehman, 1996; Harris, 1996;
Meyer and Cancian, 1998). Are former recipients able to remain
independent, and if they are, by what means do they achieve in-
dependence? Previous studies have found that approximately 60
percent of former recipients work after welfare but that more than
40 percent remain poor five years after they leave AFDC (Meyer
and Cancian, 1998). Returning to welfare after an initial exit is
common. Ellwood (1986) found that recidivism rates ranged from
34 to over 40 percent while Harris (1996) found these rates to be
11 percent within the first six months after welfare, 12 percent be-
tween months seven and twelve, and 15 percent between months
19 and 24. These returns to welfare were far higher for women
who exited AFDC by means other than marriage or work.
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Although some research examines welfare recipients after
they leave welfare, little is known about the types of jobs that
former recipients take upon exit. Little is also known about how
long they are able to maintain these jobs, how much time they
spend unemployed or out of the workforce, how much cash
assistance they receive after initially leaving welfare, and the
predictors of all these outcomes. This article will begin to address
these issues. The study will also help determine the importance of
quickly securing work after welfare rather than waiting a period
of time. It will seek to establish the ability of former recipients to
sustain employment. Finally, it will point out family, personal and
economic circumstances that may hinder financial independence.
By better understanding which former recipients are at risk of
doing poorly as well as which are positioned to do well, we can
begin to consider ways to effectively monitor and respond to
recent welfare reforms that require work and impose time limits
on recipients.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A general utility maximizing theory based on marginal costs
and benefits is used as the conceptual framework for this article.
Relating this theory to women on welfare is a relatively straight-
forward process. Women receiving welfare must make decisions
about whether or not they will continue to receive welfare, find
employment, find a partner who works, or do some combination
of these. Once they find employment, they must continually make
similar decisions so as to determine whether they will maintain
their jobs. Firms who hire former welfare recipients must also
make decisions about whether to hire welfare recipients, and if
they do, whether or not to keep them within their workforce.
These decisions will be based on the marginal productivity of
the laborer, which in turn will be determined by her ability to
learn the skills of the position and her desire to work. The welfare
recipient's decisions on work or welfare will be based, in part,
on the following considerations: the generosity of the welfare
payment in the state in which she lives, the number and ages
of children she must support, any child support payments made
by absent fathers, income earned by others in the household, the
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availability of work for which she is qualified, the wage rate which
she is able to obtain, and the costs of work (e.g., transportation,
child care). Some of these outcomes, such as the wage rate and
the likelihood of finding work, may be determined, in part, by
the former recipients' level of human capital (Becker, 1993).
All else being equal, the benefits of work will be lower in
states where welfare income is relatively high compared to states
where benefits are low. However, because many recipients feel
a stigma attached to welfare receipt, the actual value of these
payments may be lower than the dollar amount given (Rank and
Hirshl 1988). Hence, work, marriage or cohabitational rates may
be higher than expected by simply examining welfare benefits
versus earnings potential or the earnings potential of a spouse.
Critics of the AFDC system (Glazer 1988; Murray 1984; Murray
and Hernnstein 1994) argue that the likelihood of poverty and
welfare use increases as welfare benefits increase. They also argue
that the likelihood of employment decreases as welfare benefits
rise. These negative effects are said to be due to the work disin-
centive of the AFDC system. Others, such as Schram (1991, 1995),
argue that higher welfare benefits may decrease the likelihood of
poverty by giving recipients the necessary resources (i.e. money)
to help them find work and thereby increase their earnings. It is
argued that welfare recipients living in low-paying states may not
have the initial resources to find work since they lack extra money
once food and other life essentials are purchased. Thus, paying
for transportation and child care services to find work may not
be feasible for those living in states where welfare payments are
relatively low.
The number and ages of children may also have ambivalent
influences on work/welfare decisions. On the one hand, more
children within the household may increase market work by
adults in that household since the material needs of the family are
greater. On the other hand, nurturing needs may also be higher
with many children or with younger children, which may impede
market work effort by former recipients.
The availability and stability of jobs and the costs of obtaining
and maintaining work will also influence a former recipient's
decision about the amount of her market work (Edin and Lein,
1997). Living within highly concentrated areas of poverty or areas
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of high unemployment may increase the costs of finding and sus-
taining work and may therefore lead to a greater amount of wel-
fare use and lower amounts of market work (Popkin, Rosenbaum
and Meaden, 1993; Wilson 1987). Since unemployment rates are
far higher for low-skilled laborers than for higher skilled laborers,
these costs may be especially high for the poorly trained. Since
many low-skilled jobs have moved out of the largest U.S. cities
(Kasarda, 1989) and because a majority of former welfare recip-
ients have a high school diploma or less (Vartanian, 1997), these
conditions may severely hamper the decision to work. Clearly,
individuals may have little decision to make if the wages that
they can earn are relatively low and the costs of work are extraor-
dinarily high. A lack of job contacts within their area of residence
(due to low labor force participation rates), high transportation
costs or a lack of knowledge of the process of finding work may
contribute to the high information costs and to the overall high
costs of finding work.
Spending a considerable amount of time on welfare may
also increase the costs of finding work. Those who have been
on welfare for a relatively long time may have experienced an
erosion in their labor and job search skills if they have not worked
or worked very little while on welfare. They may thus be less
likely to have the skills necessary to find and maintain work than
those who have recently been in the labor market. Many studies
have found that time on welfare does not hinder the likelihood of
exiting the welfare system (Bane and Ellwood 1994; Blank 1989;
Vartanian 1997) . It is unclear, however, whether the effect of
long-term welfare receipt decreases work rates, increases welfare
recidivism rates, or increases poverty rates of former recipients.
HYPOTHESES
From this conceptual framework, several hypotheses emerge.
The first hypothesis examines the relationship between state wel-
fare payment levels, work and other economic outcomes. In other
words, we will test to determine if there is support for the hypoth-
esis that high welfare benefits increase dependence on the welfare
system after a recipient initially leaves welfare. If there is support
for this hypothesis, then decreasing benefit levels should also de-
crease dependence on the welfare system. Conversely, if evidence
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is found that former recipients in more generous welfare paying
states fare better economically than those in less generous states,
then maintaining or increasing benefit levels should not cause
greater dependence on welfare income or may act to diminish
dependence on welfare.
A second hypothesis examines the effects of length of time
on welfare to determine if former welfare recipients are hurt in
the job market by staying on welfare for relatively long periods
of time. In other words, will limiting time on welfare (as the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) mandates)
increase the likelihood of avoiding poverty after welfare? If time
on welfare shows a positive relationship with poverty status (or
shows particular relationships with other outcome variables), this
may indicate that those who have long welfare spells may be
ill prepared for the job market once they exit AFDC. Likewise,
time spent not employed after welfare is also examined so as to
determine if relatively long periods of time out of the workforce
lead to precipitously lower economic outcomes.
A third hypothesis evaluates the relationship between overall
economic conditions and the economic outcomes of former wel-
fare recipients. Area unemployment rates will be examined to
determine whether former recipients are negatively affected by
relatively high unemployment rates. This analysis will indicate to
state administrators whether economic conditions have positive
or negative effects on work related activities for former recipients.
Because Kasarda (1989) has shown that highly urbanized areas
have lost many low-skilled jobs while areas outside of urbanized
areas have gained low-skilled jobs, area of residence will also
be examined. If these effects are shown to be detrimental and
strong, state and federal lawmakers may need to take economic
conditions into account before limiting time available for wel-
fare receipt.
A fourth hypothesis examines factors of human capital, in-
cluding level of education and work experience, and their effects
on economic and labor market outcomes. In this model, it is
expected that those women who have greater levels of human
capital will fare better economically than those with less. If these
human capital effects are found to be strong, and since AFDC
recipients have been shown to possess little human capital (Bane
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and Ellwood, 1994; Vartanian, 1997) greater job training may be
necessary to improve the economic outcomes of former recipients.
DATA AND KEY VARIABLES
Dependent Variables
The data used for this study comes from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID will be used to examine six
dependent variables, all determined after an initial AFDC spell.
These dependent variables are: income relative to the poverty line,
AFDC income, the percentage of time on AFDC, the percentage
of time below the poverty line, the percentage of income derived
from transfer payments, and the percentage of time not employed.
These dependent variables will allow for a fairly complete picture
of how former welfare recipients fare economically.
To determine whether recipients continue to use AFDC after
they initially leave the system, AFDC income is measured. Be-
cause state welfare payments differ by large amounts, having
high AFDC income does not necessarily mean that recipients
stay on welfare for an extended period of time. Receiving high
levels of AFDC income may mean, however, that families are
highly dependent on welfare income, at least for a short period of
time. In order to determine how much time is spent using AFDC,
the percentage of time on AFDC is also measured. These results
will indicate if such factors as state welfare payments and area
unemployment rates are associated with time spent on welfare
after an initial AFDC exit.
Other dependent variables include the percentage of income
from transfer payments, which will indicate which recipients
are and are not relatively dependent on public assistance after
they leave AFDC, income relative to the poverty line and the
percentage of time spent below the poverty line. Income relative
to the poverty line will indicate the overall economic status of
groups but may hide those who spend much of their time below
the poverty line. This may be due to high levels of income of some
former recipients which will increase the mean income levels for
the group. Time spent below the poverty line gives a picture
of which groups are doing poorly for extended periods of time
after welfare.
48 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Independent Variables
The key independent variables in the study are drawn from
the theory described above or from past research on the AFDC
population. Each of the statistical models uses the same general
set of independent variables. The first set of these variables are
welfare related variables, including the number of years receiving
AFDC and the maximum state welfare payment in the years after
welfare (Bane and Ellwood, 1994; Blank, 1989; O'Neill, Bassi and
Wolf, 1987; Vartanian, 1997). In order to replicate Harris (1996),
we will also consider the influence of AFDC exit type (marriage,
increased earnings, other type) on work related outcomes. Type
of exit may be an important indicator of who may be the most
in need of government assistance after the newly imposed five
year time limits. Those who exit AFDC by means other than
marriage or increased earnings have been shown to be the least
likely to exit AFDC within five years.' As the PRWORA legislation
is likely to lead to more exits unrelated to marriage or increased
earnings, this factor is of particular interest within the current
policy framework
A second set of variables examines the effects of economic
conditions, education and work experience before the former re-
cipient first receives welfare and the types of jobs that the recipient
obtains after welfare on work related and economic outcomes
after welfare. These variables include the county unemployment
rate; a set of dummy variables for occupation of the former recip-
ient taken in the first year after welfare, with clerical workers as
the excluded category; and level of education, with high school
dropout as the excluded category. Most research on AFDC re-
cipients has found that unemployment and education variables
play a significant role in determining AFDC status (Blank, 1989;
Vartanian, 1997).
Area of residence (urban versus non-urban) is used in the
analysis because past research has found that welfare residents
in highly urbanized areas have lower AFDC exit probabilities
(Fitzgerald, 1995; Rank and Hirschl, 1993; Vartanian, 1997, 1999),
especially for low-skilled workers (Holtzer and Danziger, 1998).
Also controlled is region of the country (South, North Central,
West, and the excluded category of Northeast). We also control
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for the median state income levels after welfare, because many
states that have high welfare payments also have relatively high
income levels. We will control for the effects of state income to get
a better picture of the effects of welfare payments within the state.2
Personal variables, such as age, race, number of children,
whether the former recipient is the head of household, marital
status, and the birth of a child, are also controlled in the models.
Again, many of these variables have been shown to affect AFDC
spell length and exit type and may affect economic outcomes after
welfare. Including these variables within the models will give
a clearer picture of which recipients do well economically after
welfare and which do not.
Data
The PSID is a longitudinal data set that currently spans the
years 1968 to 1993. In 1968, there were approximately 5,000 fami-
lies in the data and 18,000 individuals. By 1993, the data contained
over 7,000 families and 29,000 individuals. The data contains
detailed information on income sources, family structure, and
employment situations. The PSID oversampled poor households
in order to obtain relatively large sample sizes for these house-
holds. It therefore uses weights in order to make the sample
representative of the U.S. population.
From the PSID data set, a subsample of women were selected
for this study who had spells on AFDC. These spells are deter-
mined by examining single mother heads of household who have
at least one child and who receive more than $250 (1978 dollars)
in AFDC income for the year.3 Those who continue to receive
welfare in excess of the $250 will add another year onto their
spell. Spells end when the woman no longer receives enough
AFDC income for the year to qualify as a year on AFDC. How the
recipient left welfare is then determined in the following order:
through marriage, through increased earnings, or through other
means. The spell concept was used to determine the length of
AFDC spells, and once a spell ended, exit types, to see if these
variables were predictors within the models examined. Also, only
first spells were used in the analysis, or information after the
initially observed spell, so as to maintain independence of the
observations.
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For the transfer payment, AFDC income, income relative to
the poverty line, and percentage of time under the poverty line
models, PSID data was taken from years 1969 to 1993. Once an
initial AFDC spell ended, a four year period was examined to
determine how the AFDC recipient fared during this period.
Thus, the last spell ending was in 1989 so that a full four year
period could be included.
There were a total of 758 welfare recipients who finished a
welfare spell between 1969 and 1989. All left censored cases (or
AFDC spells that were already in progress in 1968) were excluded
from the analysis because information could not be obtained as
to the length of these spells (see Alison, 1984).
In 1984, the PSID began tracking some data for heads of
households on a monthly basis. Two of these monthly variables,
AFDC status and labor force status, are used in the models ex-
amining percentage of time receiving AFDC, and percentage of
time not employed. For models examining the percentage of time
on welfare and the percentage of time unemployed or out of the
labor force, there were a total of 260 observations. These data are
from years 1984 to 1993, and again cover four year periods after
an AFDC recipient's initial welfare spell ends.
METHODOLOGY
The dependent variables in the study fall into two categories,
and are examined using two types of analyses. In the first set of
models, we examine income variables, including AFDC income
and income relative to the poverty line over the four year pe-
riod after recipients leave welfare using ordinary least squares
regression. Ordinary least squares models are also estimated for
the average AFDC income and the average income relative to the
poverty line over the four year period.
The second set of models use tobit equations to examine
the percentage of time spent in particular states. The dependent
variables in these models are the percentage of time that former
recipients use AFDC, are nonemployed, the percentage of income
from transfer payments, and the percentage of time that the family
has income below the poverty line over the four year period after
welfare. These estimates are made for all former recipients and for
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recipients who were ever in the particular condition. This means
that we can determine the percentage of time spent below the
poverty line for all former AFDC recipients and for that group that
ever spends time below the poverty line. Tobit models are used
because of censoring and truncation within the data (McDonald
and Moffit, 1980). For example, many of the AFDC recipients
receive no AFDC income after their initially observed spell on
AFDC, and therefore many have values of zero for the percentage
of time on welfare. Also, some former recipients are poor for the
entire period after welfare but by definition the percentage of time
below the poverty line is not allowed to go above 100 percent. The
tobit model is able to allow for these truncations. The tobit model
takes the following form:
Yt = XtP + It if XfP > 0
Y, = 0 if XtP + A, <0
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 gives a first look at the percentage of cases with par-
ticular conditions at different time periods after initially exiting
welfare. (The means and standard deviations of all of the variables
are given in the appendix, Table Al.) These time periods are in
the first year after exiting AFDC, then at 2, 3 and 4 years after
initially exiting AFDC. The first part of the table indicates the
percentage of former AFDC recipients with particular levels of
income at the different time periods after AFDC. Table I indicates
that 13.3 percent of the cases and under one-third (30.2%) of the
cases have income at less than half the poverty line, and above
half the poverty line but below the poverty line, respectively, in
the first year after AFDC. By year four after AFDC, over 12 percent
of former recipients are below half the poverty line, and around
38 percent are below the poverty line.
We then break down personal income by hours of work and
wages. Around one-fifth to one-quarter of former AFDC recipi-
ents do not work in any one of the periods examined following
an AFDC exit. This percentage is lowest right after exit, then
journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
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increases gradually until year four, when 24.5 percent of former
recipients work zero hours. Around 25 to 30 percent of former
recipients work between 1 and 20 hours per week in any of the
periods examined, while roughly 15 to 23 percent work between
21 and 34 hours. Almost one-third of former recipients work full
time, or 35 or more hours per week. This figure increases slightly
from the first year after welfare to years 2 and beyond. Table A.1
indicates that the average yearly number of hours of work after
welfare is 1114.26 for former recipients who work.
The wage breakdowns indicate that most former recipients
earn under $8 per hour (in 1994 dollars) in any year after ini-
tially leaving AFDC. The percentage earning below $5 an hour
increases from year 1 to year 2, then decreases to 23.1 percent by
year 4. Those earning over $11 an hour increases from around 15
percent in year I to almost 21 percent in year 4. Table A.1 indicates
that the average wage for those who work is $7.74. Median wages
for those who work after welfare are $6.97.
We also examined the likelihoods of working either 20 or more
or 35 or more hours per week at a wage of $8 or higher at different
periods after welfare. Edin and Lein (1997) note that making at
least $8 an hour is necessary for a single mother with children
to maintain work and family. We find that a relatively small
proportion of former recipients meet this criteria or the lower
criteria of working 20 or more hours at $8 or more per hour. Table
1 shows that around one-fifth to one-quarter of former recipients
work 20 or more hours at $8 or more per hour and around 13 to
16 percent get paid this wage at 35 or more hours per week.
We found that a relatively stable proportion of former recipi-
ents are married from year 1 to year 4. Roughly one-third of former
recipients are married in the four year period after they initially
leave welfare. Roughly 20 percent of family income is derived
through transfer payments after AFDC, while a slightly decreas-
ing proportion of former recipients receive AFDC payments from
years 2 to 4.
Estimates of Transfer Income as a Percentage of Total Income, AFDC
Income and Income Relative to the Poverty Line
Table 2 shows estimates of transfer income as a percentage of
total income, AFDC income and income relative to the poverty
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line for former welfare recipients for the four year period after ini-
tially leaving welfare (see Table A.2 for the coefficient estimates).
These results indicate that the welfare related variables, economic
conditions of their area of residence, and personal employment
situations make a relatively large difference in the three depen-
dent variables examined. For example, former recipients living in
states with relatively high welfare payments have higher AFDC
income and higher overall income levels relative to recipients
living in states with relatively low payment levels. The mean
average income relative to the poverty line for those living in high
paying welfare states is around one-fifth of one needs standard
higher relative to those living in low-paying welfare states. This
may be due, in part, to the higher level of AFDC income for those
in the higher paying states. These results indicate that former
recipients in higher paying states are financially better off than
those in lower paying states. Some of this may be due to better
job opportunities, and thus higher wages, in higher paying states,
and some may be due to the higher levels of work effort by former
recipients living in more generous states. Hence, relatively high
benefit levels do not decrease the standard of living for former
recipients.
We examine if these results change when we use state fixed
effects models. Our results (not shown) indicate that state welfare
payments no longer affect income relative to the poverty line,
but that AFDC income is still affected by state welfare payments.
Whether this effect is due to simply having higher payments or
because those in high welfare paying states spend more post-
welfare time receiving AFDC is investigated in the next section
of the paper.
AFDC spell length has a negative, though small, effect on
income relative to the poverty line. Those who spend seven years
on welfare have income that is, on average, around 5.5 percent
lower and transfer income relative to total income that is 16
percent higher, than those who spend only one year on welfare.
In other words, spending a long period of time on welfare has
some detrimental consequences on economic outcomes, but these
effects are not particularly large, especially the effect on total
income. Those who either marry or increase their earnings and
exit AFDC, however, have a higher average income relative to the
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
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poverty line and lower transfer income relative to total income
than those who exit via other means.
While the unemployment rate within the area of residence
does not affect the percentage of transfer income relative to total
income, it has relatively large effects on the amount of AFDC
income and overall income. Those living in areas with an un-
employment rate of around 11% (one standard deviation above
the mean) have, on average, AFDC incomes of $982 while those
living in areas where the unemployment rate is around 6% (one
standard deviation below the mean) have average AFDC income
of $472; those living in high unemployment areas on average have
income which is 27% above the poverty line while those in low
unemployment areas have incomes at 52% above the poverty line.
The types of jobs that recipients take do affect their transfer
income relative to total income, their income and their AFDC
income. For the transfer income model, those who are in crafts
or are laborers, have somewhat lower levels of transfers relative
to total income, and those who have no job in the first year after
welfare have substantially higher levels of transfers relative to
total income than those in clerical positions. Laborers, however,
and those who do not work in the first year after welfare have
higher average AFDC income and lower total income than do
clerical workers. Only those who are professionals in the first year
after AFDC have lower AFDC income and substantially higher
overall income levels than do those in clerical positions.
Work experience before welfare has significant effects on
transfer income relative to total income and overall income levels,
while those who earn their way off welfare have significantly
lower transfer to total income and higher total income levels
relative to the poverty line than women who exit via other means.
Other human capital measures such as education also affect in-
come to poverty in a favorable direction. Those women with a
high school or college diploma have significantly higher income
than those women without a high school diploma. Also, living
in large metropolitan areas affects AFDC income. Women living
in metropolitan areas receive significantly more AFDC income
on average than women living outside of these areas: $964.87
versus $426.55. This may be due to the lack of job opportunities
within these areas for relatively low skilled workers (Kasarda
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1989) or a lack of welfare stigma in more urbanized areas. Thus,
women with greater levels of work experience and education,
who are able to get jobs in the first year after welfare, who live
outside of metropolitan areas and in areas with a relatively low
unemployment rate fare economically better than those recipients
without these characteristics.
A number of personal variables make a large difference in
the living standards of former AFDC recipients. Perhaps the
first among these is having relatively few children within the
household. Women with few children in the first four years after
initially exiting AFDC have higher income levels, receive less
AFDC income and generally have lower levels of transfer income
than women with many children. Those women who have new
born children receive more AFDC income and have lower levels
of income relative to their needs than those who do not. Those
women who are heads of household for all years after their
initial welfare exit use more government assistance and have
income at a far lower level than women who are not heads
for all years. Not surprisingly, these results indicate that having
relatively few children, not having new children and living with
a spouse decrease AFDC income and/or increase income relative
to the poverty line after an initial AFDC exit.
Estimates of Time spent on AFDC, Nonemployed and
Below the Poverty Line
Table 3 gives the estimates of the percentage of time spent
using AFDC, being nonemployed, and being below the poverty
line (see table A3 for the coefficient estimates). Estimates from the
tobit models were used to determine these figures. The first col-
umn number gives the percentage of time spent in the particular
state for all former recipients. The second column excludes those
individuals who have not received any AFDC. Unlike the results
for table 2, the results for the AFDC and nonemployment models
are from monthly data from 1984 to 1993, while the percentage of
time in poverty results use all PSID years.
The results shown in table 3 mostly confirm what has been
presented in the previous sections of this paper. First, the level
of welfare payments in the state has a negative effect on time in
poverty and no effect on percentage of time receiving AFDC or
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percentage of time nonemployed. Again, it is found that AFDC
payments in the state do not have a detrimental effect on self-
sufficiency. Those women who live in more generous welfare
paying states have more income, do not spend any more time
on welfare and are just as likely to be employed as those women
in low welfare paying states.
When we use the fixed state effects models, we find that state
welfare payment level is no longer significantly related to the
percentage of time with income below the poverty line. However,
the results show that payment levels do not have detrimental
effects on the outcome variables examined here.
The results also indicate that economic conditions have a
relatively strong effect on time spent below the poverty line.
Former recipients living in areas where the unemployment rate
is one standard deviation above the mean spend 56 percent of
their time below the poverty line while former recipients living
in areas where the unemployment rate is one standard devia-
tion below the mean spend 46 percent of their post AFDC exit
time below the poverty line. The unemployment rate also has a
significant effect on the percentage of transfer income relative to
total income, with those living in areas with relatively high levels
of unemployment receiving a greater proportion of their income
from transfer payments.
The results also show that AFDC spell length has a fairly large
effect on time spent below the poverty line, but not on time spent
either receiving AFDC or not employed. Those who spend seven
years receiving AFDC spend 61 percent of their post-welfare time
below the poverty line, while those who spend a single year
receiving AFDC spend 43 percent of their time after welfare below
the poverty line. These results indicate that time on welfare does
not affect the likelihood of work for former welfare recipients,
but does affect income. This may indicate that other, unobserved
characteristics may affect length of time on AFDC, which may
then lead to lower levels of income after welfare. Those who exit
their AFDC spell via marriage or increased earnings spend far
less time receiving AFDC, far more time employed and above the
poverty line than those who exit AFDC via other means.
Other results show that women who get jobs soon after wel-
fare and who live in non-metropolitan areas spend less time on
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welfare, less time nonemployed and are less likely to be living
below the poverty line than those without these characteristics.
Greater levels of education often indicate that families formerly
on AFDC will spend less time on welfare, below the poverty line
and nonemployed.
It can again be seen that women who get jobs as professionals
spend less time on welfare than other workers, while those who
do not have a job in the first year after welfare spend considerably
more time using welfare, below the poverty line and not working
for the four year period. Also, those who earn their way off AFDC
spend far more time employed than those who exit via other
methods. Those living in urban areas spend more time on welfare
than those living outside of these areas.
Family and personal characteristics that affect the outcomes of
these dependent variables include whether the former recipient
heads a household for all four years after welfare. Those who
head their own households for all years after welfare spend 64
percent of their post-welfare years below the poverty line, while
others spend 35 percent of their time after welfare below the
poverty line. The number of children in the household as well as
newborn children affect the percentage of time below the poverty
line. This may be due to the greater child care effort expended by
the mother with either many children or young children within
the household.
DISCUSSION
The results of this research indicate that a number of key
policy variables show signs of affecting economic outcomes after
women initially leave the AFDC system. Support was found for
the effects of economic conditions within areas that former recip-
ients live. Living within large urban areas and areas with high
unemployment rates were shown to be related to lower levels
of economic independence. These results indicate that policy
makers should take area economic factors into account when
determining time limits for welfare receipt. While we may see
positive economic outcomes for former welfare recipients when
unemployment rates are low, a relatively high unemployment
rate will mean that former recipients will spend an increasing
proportion of time below the poverty line.
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Support was not found, however, for the possible detrimental
economic effects of living in states with relatively high welfare
payment levels. While living in states that have relatively high
payment levels for AFDC does increase AFDC income after ini-
tially leaving welfare, it does not increase time spent on AFDC,
non-employment, the likelihood of poverty or time spent below
the poverty line. Contrary to current political thinking, the ev-
idence here indicates that further aiding former recipients with
more income assistance will not help create a dependent class of
citizens. While time on welfare generally had no effect on work
outcomes, it did show some negative effects on time spent below
the poverty line.5
Support was also found for the human capital hypothesis and
for the positive effects of finding work soon after leaving welfare.
Such factors as level of education, work experience, exiting from
increased earnings and getting a job soon after exiting welfare
are key predictors in determining the economic independence of
former welfare recipients. Those who did not get jobs within the
first year of leaving welfare always did economically worse than
those who quickly obtained employment in each of the models ex-
amined. Those women who were in professional occupations did
the best in the models examined relative to those who got other
types of work. Of course, many former recipients are not trained
to obtain professional jobs and may need to be trained to find
any available job. Those who obtained clerical positions spent,
on average, 37 percent of their after-welfare life living below the
poverty line compared to 63 percent for those who did not get jobs
within their first year after welfare. These results may be due to
motivational differences between former recipients but may also
be due to the lack of human capital of some former recipients.
Increasing job skills for those with little human capital could
increase the economic independence of those former recipients
who now struggle to stay off welfare.
Part of the reason for the different levels of economic inde-
pendence of former recipients seems also to lie in their personal
situations. Having either a newborn child or many children de-
creases income relative to the poverty line, increases time below
the poverty line and increases AFDC income. Those women who
are heads of household for all years after ending their initial wel-
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fare spell and those women who have never been married have
lower income levels relative to the poverty line and spend more
time nonemployed than women who are married. This is likely to
be due to the increased nurturing time, and thus decreased work
time, necessary for single parent households relative to those who
have two adults available.
In order to increase the chances that former recipients are
standing on firmer economic ground, strategies should be de-
vised that take into account both personal situations as well as
their work related situations. Ignoring either of these factors will
mean that more women will slip through the social safety net
after they leave welfare. Work-related factors that need to be
considered include local area employment situations, especially
for former low-skilled recipients living within large urban areas.
Providing training services to women who are unable to find
work is also critical because many of the outcome variables ex-
amined here are dependent on levels of human capital. Former
recipients may also need on-the-job training and support since
not only education but work experience helps former recipients
financially.
In relation to recipients' personal situations, policy makers
should especially consider the needs of families with many chil-
dren and newborn children and families where the female head
has never been married. These families have extra needs for which
additional supports are required. As current welfare recipients
are forced off welfare more former recipients are likely to have
special needs since many women in these types of situations
would in the past have stayed on welfare. These supports may
include additional daycare services as well as higher wages, per-
haps through an expanded Earned Income Tax Credit system
(see Blank 1997). Providing a system where former recipients
can work half time and still make it above the poverty line as
Ellwood (1988) proposed would allow recipients to work and
still have the time to adequately nurture their children. Since
the effects of higher welfare payments are shown here not to
have the drastic disincentive effects that many fear, and because
no evidence was found for the negative effects of time spent
receiving welfare, allowing women additional time to receive
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AFDC beyond the five year limit would increase their financial
stability.
These results suggest that time limitations on welfare receipt
are not likely to move single women and their children out of
poverty. Rather, if policy makers wish to promote the long-term
economic independence of welfare recipients, attention needs
to be paid to the broader factors which contribute to women's
ability to support themselves and their families. Human capital
issues, a lack of available childcare and the mismatch between the
economic needs of welfare recipients and the type of employment
available to them all need to be addressed in any effort to reduce
poverty and welfare dependence.
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NOTES
1. See Harris (1996). For those who exit by marriage and increased earnings,
17.7% and 21.6% of their total years on AFDC are in years past year 5.
For those who exit by means other than marriage or increased earnings,
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64.9% of the years on AFDC are in years past year 5 (tabulated by the
author from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics).
2. We also use models with fixed state effects to get a better reading of the
effects of state welfare payment levels.
3. This level of AFDC income is the value used by Bane and Ellwood (1994).
I also follow Bane and Ellwood who qualified "other" welfare income
as AFDC because AFDC income was sometimes misclassified as other
income in the PSID.
4. We examined the effect of AFDC spell length on both the log of wages
and the log of hours and did not find significant effects.
5. In preliminary research using data from the 1990-1995 Survey of Income
and Program Participation, we found that time on welfare had almost
no effect on similar types of outcomes that we examined here.
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Table Al
Mean Values and Standard Deviations for Former Welfare Recipients
For a Four Year Period After An Initially Observed Spell On Welfare:
1969-1993, and For Monthly Employment and Nonemployment
Spells, 1984-1993
Mean (SD) For
Four Year Period
After Welfare
N=758
Personal Variables
Income to Needs Last Yr of Welfare Spell
Race=Black
Race=Not B/W
Race=White
Newborn Child?
Any Children Under Age 6?
Average. Number of Children
Age at End of Welfare Spell
Never Married at End of Welfare Spell
Head of Household All Years After Welfare
Economic, Work-Related and Education Variables
Hours of Work Experience Before Welfare
Avg. County Unemployment Rate
Percentage of Months Unemployed or Out of the
LF (1984-93) N=213
Occupation in the first year after welfare
Professional
Manager
Clerical
Craft
Operator
Laborer
None
Other
Missing
Average Values in the Four Year Period After
Welfare
Income-to-Needs
Wage rate
1.06 (.91)
.41 (.49)
.05 (.21)
.54 (.50)
.34 (.47)
.60 (.49)
2.14 (1.33)
32.32 (10.73)
.31 (.46)
.51 (.50)
656.06 (665.90)
8.28 (2.80)
.26 (.30)
.03 (.18)
.01 (.11)
.14 (.35)
.05 (.22)
.15 (.35)
.12 (.33)
.33 (.47)
.13 (.34)
.04 (.19)
1.41 (.85)
7.74 (4.32)
continued
Variable
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Table Al, Continued
Variable
Wage of Spouse (n=262)
Combined Wage, Spouse and Former Recipients
(n=262)
Hours of Work For Those Who Work (n=647)
Hours or Work 1 st Year After Welfare For Those
Who Work (n=568)
Hours of Work 2nd Year After Welfare For Those
Who Work (n=527)
Hours of Work 3nd Year After Welfare For Those
Who Work (n=510)
Hours of Work 4 nd Year After Welfare For Those
Who Work (n=498)
Hours of Work for Spouse (n=262)
Hours of Work, Spouse and Former Recipients
(n=262)
Education
High School Dropout
High School Grad Only
Some College Only
College Graduate
AFDC Related Variables
Marriage Exit from Welfare
Earnings Exit from Welfare
Other Exit from Welfare
Length of AFDC Spell
State Maximum Welfare Payment for a Family of
Four
Percentage of Months Using AFDC (1984-93)
N=262
Yearly Average AFDC Income
Location and State Income Variables
Live in the South
Urban Resident (Metro Area over 100,000)
Median State Income
Mean (SD) For
Four Year Period
After Welfare
12.40 (10.40)
18.77 (13.00)
1114.26 (755.43)
1308.93 (815.47)
1385.72 (872.19)
1311.80 (876.64)
1322.48 (881.27)
1910.15 (986.42)
2733.50 (1319.69)
.49 (.50)
.34 (.48)
.14 (.34)
.02 (.15)
.27 (.45)
.48 (.50)
.24 (.42)
4.18 (3.72)
676.72 (271.02)
.16 (.29)
695.12 (1561.67)
.27 (.44)
.53 (.50)
41923.40 (5415.99)
Note: All dollar figures are in 1994 dollars. The values in the table are four year
average values.
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